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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HENRY C. DEHM, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
YVONNE G. DEHM, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 13964 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This was a motion by a husband to modify a divorce 
decree to reduce or eliminate alimony; with cross motions by 
the wife to increase child support, to require the husband 
to continue to support the children for an indefinite period 
beyond the age of majority, and to require the husband to 
continue insurance and pay for orthodontal care beyond the 
age of majority. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court denied the motions to reduce or elimi-
nate alimony, and to increase child support. It granted 
the wife's motion to require the husband to continue child 
support and other benefits beyond the age of majority. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant [Mr. Dehm] seeks reversal of the order 
entered below and remand with instructions to modify the 
divorce decree to reduce alimony to a nominal amount, and 
vacate those portions of the order providing for child 
support and benefits beyond the age of majority. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 5, 1967, a decree of divorce was entered which 
contained the following provisions: 
"That the plaintiff be and he is hereby 
ordered and required to pay to the defendant 
the sum of $625.00 per month commencing on 
the first day of June, 1967, and on the first 
day of each succeeding month thereafter until 
the further order of the court, which payment 
is allocated $300.00 per month as alimony to 
terminate upon defendants remarriage and 
$325.00 per month as support for said children 
to terminate upon their attaining their major-
ity; and the plaintiff be and he is hereby 
ordered and required to pay and discharge as 
and when incurred all reasonable charges for 
orthodontal care and treatment pertaining to 
said children, but not to exceed the sum of 
$2,500.00." (R.19,20). 
"That the plaintiff be and he is hereby 
ordered and required to maintain at his sole 
cost and expense and without encumbrance not 
less than $50,000.00 worth of life insurance 
on his life, said insurance to cover defendant 
and the two minor children of the parties un-
til this divorce becomes final; and after the 
divorce becomes final, to cover the minor child-
ren of the parties during their minority." 
(R.21). 
At the time of the divorce Mrs. Dehm was making $220.00 
per month working part time for the Holladay Childrens 
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General life insurance policy with a 1974 death benefit of 
$54,024.00; a life insurance certificate, death benefit 
$8,000.00, with the State of Utah Employers Group Fund 
(R.110); retirement benefits paid for by the State of Utah 
(R.122); a 1969 Dodge Dart (R.124); and a color television 
(R.145). 
At the time of the divorce the children were entered in 
private schools and were aided by tutors at a combined cost 
of around $90.00 per month; shortly after the divorce the 
children were taken out of private schools, the tutors were 
dispensed with, and the children were sent to public schools 
(R.121). 
The amount of physical care required by the children 
has decreased since the divorce proceedings. It is not 
necessary to hire sitters while the children are alone 
during the day (R.123), and Mrs. Dehm is able to travel con-
siderably in connection with her job by hiring a woman to 
stay with the children at a rate of $15.00 per day plus her 
board (R.127). The children have been working at the Habili-
tation Center during the summer months at a rate of $1.90 an 
hour for four hours a day (R.145). 
On August 13, 1974, plaintiff moved the trial court for 
an order reducing or eliminating the payment of alimony 
by the plaintiff to the defendant based on change of circum-
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stances in her earning capability since the divorce decree 
was entered (R.23). The defendant filed countermotions 
seeking to overrule and deny plaintiff's motion; to increase 
the alimony to at least $300.00 per month per child; to 
modify the decree of divorce to extend support payments, 
orthodontist expense, and medical and hospital insurance for 
the children for an indefinite period of time beyond their 
attaining the age of majority; to require the life insurance 
trust established by the husband for the childrens1 benefit 
be made irrevocable for an indefinite period beyond the 
childrens" reaching age of majority; for attorneys fees and 
cost relating to this action; and any further relief deemed 
proper by the court (R.30,31). 
The trial court modified and amended the decree of 
divorce to require plaintiff to continue making child sup-
port payments of $325.00 per month for an indefinite period 
beyond the age of majority as child support; to pay and dis-
charge indefinitely all charges for orthodontal care and 
treatment pertaining to said children not exceeding $2,500.00; 
to maintain indefinitely and without exception or limitation 
relating to the age of the children a $50,000.00 life insur-
ance trust in favor of the children in a sum of not less 
than $50,000.00. Plaintiff's motion to reduce or terminate 
alimony payments and defendant's counter-motion to increase 
-5-
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child support payments were denied (R.42,43). 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION 
AND COMMITTED ERROR IN ORDERING PLAINTIFF 
AND APPELLANT TO CONTINUE SUPPORT PAYMENTS 
AND INSURANCE PROGRAMS FOR THE CHILDREN 
AFTER THEIR MAJORITY. 
A divorce court has continuing jurisdiction under 
30-3-5 Utah Code Annotated 1953, to make subsequent changes 
or new orders with respect to the maintenance and support of 
the parties and their children: '. • 
"When a decree of divorce is made, the 
court may make such orders in relation to the 
children, property and parties, and the main-
tenance of the parties and children, as may 
be equitable. The court shall have continuing 
jurisdiction to make such subsequent changes 
or new orders with respect to the support and 
maintenance of the parties, the custody of the 
children and their support and maintenance, or 
the distribution of the property as shall be 
reasonable and necessary." 
The statute does not define "children," but this court 
has held that support obligations terminate when children 
reach adulthood. In Anderson v. Anderson, 110 Utah 300, 
172 P.2d 132, 135 (1946), there was an ambiguity with respect 
to the terms "alimony" and "support money". The findings 
showed an intention to award both but the decree referred to 
"alimony" for the "support of the children". This court, in 
defining these terms, stated: 
-G-
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"Alimony relates to support of the divorced 
wife, and support money relates to compensa-
tion to a spouse for the support of minor 
children," [Emphasis added.] 
The court in,Stanton v. Stanton, 30 Utah 2d 315, 517 
P.2d 1010, 1011 (1974), footnoted 30-3-5 Utah Code Annotated 
1953, to the following statement: 
"The trial court ruled in accordance with the 
assumption since time immemorial in our law 
that our statutes dealing with the support of 
'children1 meant during the period of minority, 
and denied her petition." [Emphasis added.] 
In Stanton the plaintiff challenged the constitution-
ality of 15-2-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953, which specifies 
that the "period of minority extends in males to the age of 
21 years and in females to that of 18 years." Although the 
United States Supreme Court subsequently reversed the Utah 
decision on the ground that different ages of majority for 
men and women was unconstitutional, it did not affect deci-
sions to the effect that support of children in divorce pro-
ceedings continues only during minority, at whatever age it 
terminates. 
In Harding v. Harding, 26 Utah 2d 277, 488 P.2d 308, 
309 (1971), a reduction in alimony was sought by the husband 
based on a reduction of monthly income from $715.00 to 
$540.00 per month when he transferred departments. The 
trial court reduced the alimony obligation from $250.00 to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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I 
$200.00 per month and the husband appealed, contending the 1 
reduction was too small. In conjunction with the "change in 
income" argument, the husband contended the trial court • 
improperly considered the adult children's continued resi- I 
dence in the family home when setting the alimony payment. 
This court's affirmance of the lower court's determination I 
was based primarily on a reluctance to permit a party to 
voluntarily reduce his income and then use that as a basis • 
for a reduction in alimony and support payments. With I 
respect to the children the court commented: 
"As to plaintiff's point concerning support I 
of the adult children: It is true that 
neither the plaintiff or the defendant has 
any legal duty to support them; and that it I 
would be improper for the court to make an • 
order so directing the plaintiff." 
In Farley v. Farley, 227 Cal.App.2d 1, 38 Cal.Rpts. 357, I 
362 (1964), the California Court of Appeals interpreted a • 
Utah divorce decree purporting to vest title to California 
real property in the parties' minor children when the young- I 
est attained the age of eighteen years. The court concluded 
that the decree exceeded the jurisdiction of the Utah court, I 
was vulnerable to collateral attack in Utah, and was not I 
entitled to full faith and credit in California inasmuch as 
the decree attempted to dispose of the husband's assets for I 
the benefit of his adult children. The court stated: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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«»* * * The cited Utah cases convince 
us the decree is valid to the extent that 
it serves the above purposes during the 
children's minority. The decree goes far-
ther, however. It effectively divests 
Mr. Farley of all interests in the land for 
the purpose of vesting it, or its remaining 
proceeds, in the children when they reach 
adulthood. The Utah court has attempted 
an inter vivos disposition of the husband's 
estate for the benefit of his adult children. 
No Utah case has been brought to our atten-
tion which lends direct or inferential sup-
port to such a disposition upon divorce; nor 
in our view, may the broad language of the 
Utah statute be stretched to such an extreme." 
n* * * rp^ e utah statute and Utah decisions 
lend no support to this award; the presumption 
of parallel doctrines impels its rejection. 
We conclude that the award exceeds the juris-
diction of the Utah courts to the extent that 
it decrees transfer of property or money to 
the children when they reach adulthood. The 
lack of jurisdiction appears on the face of 
the Utah decree." 
The California court's action was affirmed by both the 
trial court and Utah Supreme Court in Farley v. Farley, 19 
Utah 2d 301, 431 P.2d 133 (1967), when the case came back to 
Utah for modification of the original decree. 
For additional Utah cases holding that the child support 
obligation terminates when the child attains the age of 
majority, see Murphy v. Moyle, 17 Utah 113, 53 P.1010 (1898); 
Rees v. Archibald, 6 Utah 2d 264, 311 P.2d 788 (1957); 
Columbo v. Walker Bank and Trust Co., 26 Utah 2d 350, 489 
P.2d 998 (1971). 
The Utah position is in accord with the general rule on 
_n_ 
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this issue: 
"Largely in reliance upon the com-
monly expressed rule that when a child 
of the parties to a divorce or separation 
action attains his majority, authority of 
the court over such child comes to an end, 
it has been held or recognized, except in 
a few scattered cases, that a court in a 
divorce or separation suit is without 
power to provide for the support of, or aid 
to, an adult child of the parties, or to 
continue a provision for support after a 
child attains his majority." Ann., Power 
of Court in Divorce or Separation Suit to 
Provide for Support of, or Aid to, Adult 
Child, or to Continue Provision for Support 
After Child Attains Majority, 162 A.L.R. 
1084, 1985 (1946") . 
"A divorce court has no power to continue a 
provision for the support of a child after 
he attains his majority." 24 Am.Jur.2d, 
Divorce and Separation, §855. 
While there are no Utah decisions on the point, other 
courts, almost without exception, hold that a divorce court 
is without authority to order support for an adult child 
even if said child is physically and mentally incapacitated 
to provide for his own maintenance. In the annotation above 
cited, 162 A.L.R. 1084, 1090, 1091, the rule is well stated: 
"While it has often been recognized 
that a parent who is financially able may 
be compelled to maintain, or to pay for 
necessaries furnished to, an adult child 
who is incapacitated, the cases agree, al-
most without exception, that the court in a 
divorce suit is without authority to pro-
vide for such an adult child's support, the 
divorce court's control over the child, or 
its care, terminating with his attainment 
of majority." [Emphasis added.] 
i n~ 
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In O'Hair v.. O'Hair, 109 Ariz. 236, 508 P.2d 66 (1973), 
the court applied the general rule in refusing to compel the 
husband to provide support payments for the parties' blind 
and mentally defective daughter after her twenty-first 
birthday. 
I n
 Levy v. Levy, 245 Cali.App.2d 341, 53 Cal.Rptr. 790 
(1966), a divorce decree was ruled invalid where it purport-
ed to provide for the support of the parties' mentally 
disturbed and dependent adult child even though the parents 
had a duty to support imposed by statute. It was there held 
that the legislature had failed to provide for the power of 
the court to provide for the support of an adult child in a 
divorce proceeding. 
In Genda v. Superior Court, 103 Ariz. 240, 439 P.2d 811 
(1968), the court permitted the support obligation to 
continue beyond the parties' mentally retarded son's attain-
ing the age of majority based on a property settlement 
agreement expressly providing for that result. However, the 
court stated that in the absence of such an agreement the 
applicable law is as follows: 
"Even in those cases where the adult 
child is physically or mentally incapacitated 
to provide for his own maintenance, the auth-
orities quite consistently hold that the equity 
court in a divorce action or supplemental pro-
ceeding is without authority to provide for 
such adult child's support, in the absence of 
statutory authority or contract." [Emphasis 
added.] 
-11-
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See also Kizer v. Kizer, 191 N.E.2d 332 (Ind.1963); 
Reynolds v, Reynolds,•274 Ala, 477, 149 So.2d 770 (1961); 
Murrah v. Bailes, 255 Ala. 178, 50 So.2d 735 (1951); 
Borchert v. Borchert, 185 Md. 586, 45 A.2d 463; Beilstein v, 
Beilstein, 61 N.E.2d 620, 31 Ohio 0.116 (1945); Bodle v. 
Bodle; 37 Ohio L.Abs. 131, 46 N.E.2d 472 (1940). 
In 1957 the Utah Legislature adopted the Uniform Civil 
Liability For Support Act (Title 78, Chapter 45, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953), which imposes a duty on the parent to sup-
port a son or daughter of whatever age who is incapacitated 
from earning a living and without sufficient means. Simi-
larly, 17-14-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953, adopted in 1898, 
imposes a duty to support poor relatives. But the Uniform 
Civil Liability For Support Act (78-45-9 Utah Code Annoted 
1953) gives the right of enforcement to the obligee (child) 
or the State Department of Public Welfare, and the 1898 Act 
bestows the right of enforcement on the Board of County 
Commissioners. Neither act is applicable to a divorce 
proceeding, and the obligation of the parents must be en-
forced by the obligors named in the act, i.e., the children. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE TERMINATED 
OR REDUCED THE ALIMONY HERETOFORE AWARD 
ED TO THE DEFENDANT 
The divorce court is authorized by virtue of 30-3-5 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
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Utah Code Annotated 1953, to make modifications in the 
divorce decree respecting alimony and child support. The 
changes must be reasonable, proper and based on a substan-
tial change in the material circumstances of either one or 
both of the parties since the decree was entered. Buzzo v. 
Buzzo, 45 Utah 625, 148 P.362 (1915); Sorensen v. Sorensen, 
20 Utah 2d 360, 438 P.2d 180 (1968). 
In the instant case the facts disclose a material 
change in the circumstances of Mrs. Dehm since the divorce 
was granted. Subsequent to the divorce, she attained a 
Bachelor's Degree in Sociology and a Master's Degree in 
Educational Psychology, and her monthly income increased 
from $220.00 to $946.00 per month, and she acquired sub-
stantial assets. In Sorensen v. Sorensen, supra, this court 
indicated that such changes constitute a pertinent factor in 
a proceeding to reduce the alimony award: 
"The fact that the wife owns property 
which has increased substantially in value 
or ability to produce income after the entry 
of the decree for alimony is an important 
consideration..." 
In Harrison v. Harrison, 22 Utah 2d 180, 450 P.2d 456 
(1969) , the court determined that evidence indicating defen-
dant's income was substantially greater than the amount 
determined at the trial was a sufficient showing of changed 
circumstances to support the trial court's modification of 
-13-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the prior decree. In Harrison, child support payments were 
increased from $300.00 per month to $400.00 per month and 
the alimony provision was modified from $75.00 per month to 
$500.00 per month when it was shown defendant's income was 
far greater than the $600.00 per month salary originally 
represented to the court. 
The case of King v. King, 27 Utah 2d 303, 495 P.2d 823 
(1972), is somewhat analogous to the case at bar. There, 
alimony payments of $250.00 per month were required of the 
defendant husband until the home debt was paid off, with 
$200.00 per month payments thereafter. This award was based 
in part on a finding that plaintiff had a nervous disorder 
and back trouble making her incapable of holding employment. 
Subsequent to the divorce her conditions improved to such an 
extent that she could accept gainful employment. Based on 
this change of circumstances the court affirmed a reduction 
in alimony to a sum of $100.00 for the next six months and 
$50.00 for the following year. Thereafter, the trial court's 
decision to terminate alimony payments was modified to 
provide alimony in a nominal sum. Although the court in the 
original trial made no finding as to Mrs. Dehm's earning 
capacity, her testimony was that she was restricted to part-
time employment because of the time and effort required in 
caring for the parties' handicapped children. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
For similar results in other jurisdictions see the 
cases cited in Ann., Change in Financial Condition or Needs 
of Husband or Wife as Grounds for Modification of Decree 
for Alimony or Maintenance, 18 A.L.R. 2d 10 (1951) and 24 
Am.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, §680: 
"The fact that the wife was not em-
ployed when the decree for alimony or main-
tenance was entered but secured employment 
later is often an important consideration 
in determining whether to reduce or termi-
nate the payments." 18 A.L.R.2d at 59. 
"The fact that a wife, who was unem-
ployed when a decree for alimony was entered, 
has since secured employment, or that her in-
come at the time of the decree has increased 
or decreased substantially, may justify a 
modification of the decree..." 24 Am.Jur.2d, 
Divorce and Separation, §680. 
A change in income is an important consideration in 
modifying the alimony award but other circumstances may 
render the original decree proper under the circumstances. 
In this regard it is important to distinguish a few recent 
Utah cases. 
I n
 Ring v. Ring, 29 Utah 2d 436, 511 P.2d 155 (1973) 
the defendant husband sought to terminate his alimony obli-
gation on the grounds his former wife had received addi-
tional training and substantially increased her salary. The 
trial court granted defendant's motion and reduced the 
alimony payment from $600.00 per month to $1.00 per year. 
On appeal, the lower court was reversed on a finding that 
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the parties originally stipulated that $800.00 per month was 
reasonable and necessary to support the family unit. The 
apportionment between alimony and child support was moti-
vated by tax considerations rather than the respective needs 
of the wife and children. The grounds for reversal are well 
summarized by the court: 
"[Djefendant initially resisted the 
award of alimony on the ground that plaintiff 
had the ability and income to support herself. 
With full knowledge of these facts, defendant 
voluntarily entered into a stipulation granting 
plaintiff alimony. Defendant then proceeded 
to effect a termination on the same ground 
that he had previously abandoned when he had 
agreed to the stipulation, namely that his wife 
was qualified to support herself." P.158,159. 
I n
 Felt v. Felt, 27 Utah 2d 103, 493 P.2d 620 (1972) 
this court reversed the trial court's reduction of alimony 
payments of $12,000.00 to $1.00 per year despite the fact 
the wife was only working part-time at the time of the 
decree and had taken on full-time employment subsequent to 
that date. However, this case is easily distinguished as a 
property settlement agreement executed by the parties and 
incorporated as part of the decree, contemplated that the 
wife intended to seek more than part-time work. The court 
stated: 
"The court, upon hearing the matter, 
must have understood that Mrs. F accepted 
the $1,000 per month alimony on condition 
that she could supplement it with other in-
come, — otherwise the provision, to which 
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Mr. F, without objection, voluntarily be-
came signatory, made no sense.11 P. 622. 
The court reasoned that to modify the decree would 
thwart the expressed intention of the parties as expressed 
in the settlement agreement. In addition, the trial court 
improperly relied on facts which were before the court 
rendering the original decree, facts which could not consti-
tute changed circumstances. 
The cases of Allen v. Allen, 25 Utah 2d 87, 475 P.2d 
1021 (1970), and Short v. Short, 25 Utah 2d 326, 481 P.2d 54 
(1971), are also easily distinguished. In these cases 
modification of alimony was denied because at the time the 
divorce decree was rendered the parties contemplated the 
wife would contribute to her own support by seeking outside 
employment. In the instant case, the defendant did not con-
template full-time employment because of her responsibility 
to care for and constantly supervise the girls. 
Alimony is provided for the "support and maintenance" 
of the wife, not as a form of permanent penance for the 
husband. If the need ceases, the alimony should cease. 
Ill 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING 
FINDINGS OF FACT WITH RESPECT TO 
THE EARNINGS OF PLAINTIFF AND HIS 
PRESENT SPOUSE 
The court's Finding No. 3 refers to the income of the 
plaintiff and his present spouse. Such a finding was impro-
_1 -7_ 
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per based on the trial court's determination that evidence 
respecting the expenditures of the plaintiff was inadmiss-
ible because not material to the question before the court. 
In the direct examination of Mr. Dehm, counsel offered evi-
dence with respect to his expenditures and financial condi-
tions in an effort to show the relative change in financial 
condition of the parties. The following occurred in this 
examination (R.105): 
Q What is the condition of your home? 
MR. GUSTIN: Now, if the Court please, 
I can't see any difference at this time. 
THE COURT: Mr. Roe, how does it help us? 
MR. ROE: Well, Your Honor, we are getting 
into the question of needs and relative needs 
and earning capacities of the parties. And I 
think the expenses and necessary expenses of the 
husband are material to that question. 
THE COURT: As I read the file the issue 
was a change in the earning capacity of the defen-
dant since the decree. That's the only ground 
set forth in the motion, was it not? 
MR. GUSTIN: That's the only ground of the 
plaintiff. 
MR. ROE: Yes, well fine, if we are limited 
to that. 
Notwithstanding the court's ruling that the only mater-
ial question of fact was the earnings of the defendant at 
the time of the hearing as compared with her earnings at the 
time of the divorce, the court based its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Amendment of Decree at least in 
-i a -
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part, upon the earnings of plaintiff. 
IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
PLAINTIFFfS MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure author-
izes the granting of a new trial on a showing of irregular-
ity in the proceedings of the court by which a party was 
prevented from having a fair trial, insufficiency of evi-
dence to justify the decision, and error in law. As particu-
larized in Point III, by ruling that the earnings and finan-
cial condition of Mr. Dehm would not be considered by the 
court in connection with his motion for reduction or termi-
nation of alimony, and thereafter relying on the earnings of 
plaintiff in denying said motion, the court prevented plain-
tiff from having a fair trial on that issue. In addition, 
there is insufficiency of evidence to justify the court's 
finding and the court committed an error in law by extending 
support payments beyond the children's attaining the age of 
majority. 
CONCLUSION 
Under Utah law there is no authority for a court in a 
divorce proceeding to direct the payment of support for 
children beyond the age of majority. Furthermore, by fail-
ing to reduce or terminate alimony payments on a showing of 
material change in circumstances of the defendant's earning 
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capacity since the divorce decree was entered, the court 
misconceived the law, the facts and issues. 
The order of the trial court should be reversed and the 
case remanded with directions to reduce the alimony to a 
nominal sum, and vacate that portion of the order that re-
quires Mr. Dehm to pay child support and provide other bene-
fits after the children reach their majority. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Bryce E. Roe 
ROE AND FOWLER 
340 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
